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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL FAIR USE*
The first amendment commands that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech."' Notwithstanding this
prohibition, the copyright clause of the Constitution empowers Con-
gress to enact legislation granting authors, for a limited time, "the
exclusive right to their writings."'2 The most recent exercise of this
affirmative mandate is the Copyright Revision Act,3 which became
effective January 1, 1978.1 The new Act, subject to certain limita-
tions, 5 grants the copyright owner exclusive rights to reproduce,
adapt, publish, perform, and display his copyrighted work.' The Act
thereby sanctions a qualified abridgement of the freedom of speech.
A law imposing a limited restraint on speech is not necessarily
unconstitutional. The first amendment does not give absolute pro-
tection to every utterance; 7 its reference to "no law" has not been
interpreted literally.' Significant, though diminishing, limitations
on the freedom of expression remain9 because some expressions con-
* The original draft of this paper won the 1978 Nathan Burkan Competition at the
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, the College of William and Mary.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8. The clause, in its entirety, gives Congress the power "To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
3. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. (1977).
4. All sections of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 became effective January 1, 1978,
except sections 118, 304(b) and chapter 8, which took effect on October 19, 1976.
5. Statutory limitations on the exclusive rights of authors may be grouped into two catego-
ries. The first category is the doctrine of fair use. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977); text accompa-
nying notes 47-64 infra. The second category contains a number of specific exemptions from
copyright control. See Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.SC.A. §§ 108-112 (1977). For a
thorough treatment of the exemptions itemized in the new Act, see Seltzer, Exemptions and
Fair Use in Copyright: The "Exclusive Rights" Tensions in the New Copyright Act, 24 BULL.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 215 (1977).
6. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (1977); see H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in [1976] U. S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5674.
7. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957).
8. Despite Justice Black's arguments that "no law" should be interpreted as "no law," the
Court has rejected such an interpretation of the first amendment. See, e.g., Konigsberg v.
State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, -, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2708 (1977)(dic-
tum) (first amendment protection of commercial speech does not extend to false, deceptive,
or misleading advertising); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscene material is
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tribute nothing to the unfettered dialogue that the guarantee of free
speech was meant to secure. Legislation affecting first amendment
freedoms, however, is subject to a heavy burden of justification and
must withstand strict judicial scrutiny.
Copyright law protects -expression. A person who copyrights his
speech obtains a limited monopoly on the expression of his ideas;
other persons may not copy that expression unless the owner's per-
mission is obtained and, in some instances, a royalty is paid. If a
copyrighted expression is appropriated unlawfully, the owner's
rights are enforceable judicially; the infringer may be liable for
damages or may be enjoined' from using the copyrighted material.
The prohibition against copying an expression, however, does not
extend to the idea itself;' 1 ideas may not be copyrighted.'2 Copy-
righting a work does not preclude others from using it or from deal-
ing with the same subject matter; rather, it precludes reproduction
of a similar text.1 3 Copyright thus limits the freedom of speech to
the extent that it prohibits "servile imitation"'4 of a copyrighted
expression.
If only verbatim copying were prohibited, there would be little
need for inquiry into the relationship between copyright and the
first amendment. Restrictions against reproduction of the expres-
sion of an idea, when use of the idea is unrestricted, would seem to
not protected by the first amendment); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964) (defamatory statements concerning a public official published with actual malice are
not protected constitutionally); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)
(lewd, profane, libelous, and insulting words are not protected by the first amendment). Laws
punishing perjury and fraud are other accepted limitations on freedom of speech.
10. See Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-502, 504 (1977).
11. A leading case representing this fundamental principle is Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879). See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[A] copyright gives no exclusive right
to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the idea-not the idea
itself.") (footnote omitted). See also Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and
Representation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1569, 1570 (1963); Libott, Round the Prickly Pear:
The Idea-Expression Fallacy in a Mass Communications World, 16 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. 30 (1968).
12. The new Act states that "[c]opyright protection subsists ...in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . ." Copyright Revision Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (1977). This rather expansive suggestion of the scope of copyright
protection is followed by an important caveat: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of opera-
tion, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." Id. § 102(b).
13. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHuRIEuD VIEW OF CoPYmGr 14 (1967).
14. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 139 n.(b) (K.B. 1785) (Lord Mansfield).
[Vol. 20:85
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detract inappreciably from the substance of first amendment val-
ues. The problem, however, is not so easily dismissed. The line
between an idea and its expression is not always distinct.,' More-
over, something more than the mere theft of literal text is protected
by copyright; were it otherwise, "a plagiarist would escape by im-
material variations.""6 Precisely how much more is protected is a
recurring question in the law of copyright. Infringement is defined
in copyright law as substantial similarity, lying somewhere between
"complete and literal similarity"17 and complete dissimilarity.'8
Within this ill-defined area of substantial similarity lies the greatest
potential for conflict between the first amendment and copyright.'9
In the last decade commentators began to explore this potential
conflict between copyright and the first amendment." Although
lower federal courts increasingly have been sensitive to this issue,2'
15. See note 113 infra & accompanying text.
16. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
17. 3 M. NIMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A], at 13-15 (1978).
18. See id. Courts and commentators have developed a number of tests to aid in making
the difficult determination of substantial similarity. Compare Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) (infringement exists
if there are suffibiently similar "patterns" shared by the two works) with Harold Lloyd Corp.
v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir. 1933) (infringement exists if the "audience" or an "ordinary
observer" would get the same idea from the copy as they would from the original) and W. H.
Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82, 87 (6th Cir. 1928) (infringement
exists if there is a sufficient quantity of "common errors"). Professor Nimmer discusses two
types of substantial similarity: (1) comprehensive nonliteral similarity and (2) fragmented
literal similarity. Comprehensive nonliteral similarity occurs "where the fundamental essence
or structure of one work is duplicated in another [resulting in] comprehensive similarity but
no word for word or other literal similarity." 3 NiMMER, supra note 17, § 13.031A][1], at
13-16. Fragmented literal similarity is literal similarity which is not comprehensive. Id. §
13.03[A][2], at 13-27 through 13-28. See generally Fleming, Substantial Similarity: Where
Plots Really Thicken, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 252 (1971); Sorensen & Sorensen, Re-
examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literal Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis,
37 CORNELL L.Q. 638 (1952).
19. Goldstein, Copyright and The First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 983, 984 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 19; Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amend-
ment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970); Patterson,
Private Copyright and Public Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. Rxv.
1161 (1975); Perlman & Rhinelander, William & Wilkins Co. v. United States: Photocopying,
Copyright, and the Judicial Process, 1975 Sup. CT. Rxv. 355, 403-10; Rosenfield, The Consti-
tutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAMtE LAw. 790 (1975); Sobel,
Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. Symp.
43 (1971).
21. See, e.g., Wainwright Secs. Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 730 (1978) ("Some day [courts may be required] to
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the Supreme Court has not identified the "constitutional parame-
ters of copyright."" This Note will identify the ways in which copy-
right law and the first amendment may conflict and attempt to
provide a framework by which those conflicts, if in fact they exist,
may be reconciled.
OBJECTIVES OF COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The First Amendment
The first amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech defies
strict definition;2 3 its limits have changed with the "felt necessities
of time."24 Through the years the right of free speech has expanded
gradually,2s a trend indicative of the Supreme Court's continued
distinguish between the doctrine of fair use and 'an emerging constitutional limitation on
copyright contained in the first amendment.' ") (quoting Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180, 1200
(1970)); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875
(S.D. Fla. 1978) (although the defendant's use of a copy of the plaintiff's publication was not
protected by the doctrine of fair use, the court held that an injunction against the defendant's
use of that publication would violate the first amendment); Fur Information & Fashion
Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("While
Congress may limit [first amendment] rights to prevent . . . copyright infringement ....
such limitation must be drawn narrowly, so as . . . [to avoid] unnecessary impingement on
the right of free speech."). A number of other courts, however, have refused to accept a first
amendment defense in infringement cases. See, e.g., United States v. Bodin, 375 F. Supp.
1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1974) (first amendment defense rejected because "no restraint [was]
placed on the use of an idea or concept"); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 346 F.
Supp. 376, 383 (D. Conn. 1972) ("free exercise does not include the wholesale appropriation
of another's literary, artistic and musicial works"); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers,
Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) ("Defendants' First Amendment argument...
can be dismissed as flying in the face of established law.") (citations omitted).
22. Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 888 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari). The Court, in Smith v. California, 375 U.S. 259 (1963), implicitly rejected an
argument that copyright and the first amendment are fundamentally inconsistent. See 1
NiMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[A], at 1-67 n.19; Sobel, supra note 20, at 68, 70. See also
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 n.13 (1977) (5-4 decision),
in which the Court noted, with apparent approval, that "Federal District Courts have rejected
First Amendment challenges to the federal copyright law on the ground that 'no restraint
[has been] placed on the use of an idea or concept."' (citations omitted).
23. Scholars have long debated the meaning of the free speech guarantee. See, e.g., Z.
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION (1970); P. KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1962); A. MIEKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Frantz, The First Amendment
in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amend-
ment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962).
24. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
25. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) ("The modem history of
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solicitude for first amendment freedoms. I
There is less disagreement that the guarantee of freedom of
speech reflects "a profound national commitment. . . that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, ,qnd wide-open. '2 6
The validity of ideas and opinions may be appraised and the truth
discovered only when free expression exists .2 The liberty to speak
one's thoughts is a right valued "both as an end-nd as a means;" '
it is a right indispensable both to a self-governing society and to the
realization of individual fulfillment. 9
Copyright
Neither the new Copyright Revision Act nor its legislative history
state the purpose of copyright. The Constitution is more helpful; it
provides that Congress is empowered to-enact legislation "[t]o pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts. 30 Unfortunately, how-
ever, "[t]he history and background of the formulation and adop-
tion of the. . . copyright clause is largely unrecorded."'3' The clause
was adopted in its present form without debate. 2 James Madison,
alone among the Framers to comment about q6pyright, relegated
discussion of the clause to one paragraph in The Federalist.33
the guarantee of freedom of speech . . . has been one of a search for the outer limits of that
right."). In the last fifteen years the Court has increased the number of the categories of
communication protected by the free speech guarantee. The first amendment now protects
commercial speech, Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976); defamatory statements concerning public officials if published without mal-
'ice, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); offensive language, Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); and sexually explicit matter if not obscene, Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (Brennan, J.). See also West
Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U..S. 624 (1943) (Jackson, J.); Masses Publishing
Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (L. Hand, J.).
27. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
28. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
29. See id.
30. The meaning of this introductory phrase of the copyright clause rarely has been consid-
ered by the Court. For some examples, see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Mazer
v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
31. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 395. At the Constitutional Convention, the
Committee on Detail, which drafted the copyright clause, left no records on the subject. See
Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J.
109, 112-14 (1929).
32. 1 NiMMER, supra note 17, § 1.01[A]; see 2 M. FARRmAD, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTON Or 1787, at 508-10 (rev. ed. 1937).
33. The paragraph reads:
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Congress passed the first American copyright statute in 1790.1 Its
express purpose was identical to that of its English ancestor, the
Statute of Anne: "An Act for the encouragement of learning." ' This
explicit statement of purpose has been confirmed repeatedly by
courts and commentators. Copyright, then, is an expression of pub-
lic policy based on "the conviction that encouragement of individ-
ual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors .... ,,36
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reasons to belong to the inventors.
The Public Good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases,
and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at
the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison) (emphasis supplied).
34. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802). The new statute is the fourth
major revision of the original Act, the others occurring in 1831, 1870, and 1909. Goldman, The
History of US.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1101
(A. Fisher ed. 1963). The history of early American copyright legislation is reviewed in T.
SOLBERG, COPYRGmHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904, COPYRIGHT OFICE BULL. No. 8 (1905), and in
Goldman, The History of U.S.A. Copyright Law Revision from 1901 to 1954, in 2 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 1101 (A. Fisher ed. 1963). For more detailed histories of copyright law, see E.
DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879); L. PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIvE (1968).
35. 8 Anne 1, c. 19 (1709). This statute has been characterized as "the paradigm for all
subsequent copyright legislation in England and the United States." Goldstein, supra note
19, at 983-84. It was undoubtedly the source of the first American copyright act, see Seltzer,
supra note 5, at 222, and most likely was the source of the copyright clause. See Patterson,
supra note 20, at 1200. The development of copyright law in both the United States and
England is succinctly summarized in KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 1-37. For a more detailed
account of copyright development in England, see F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
ENGLAND, 1476-1776, at 74-260 (1952).
36. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). Chief Justice Hughes once remarked that "the
primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie[s] in the general benefits derived
by the public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)
(emphasis supplied). This notion of the primacy of public welfare later was reaffirmed by
Justice Douglas: "The copyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary considera-
tion." United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (emphasis sup-
plied). "Both quotations have a preeminence far beyond what the context in which they were
fashioned would dictate." Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 402. Unfortunately, the
statements add confusion to the law of copyright by suggesting that the interests of the author
and society are somehow opposed.
It is paradoxical to state that reward to an author is a secondary consideration when the
copyright system is premised on the theory that economic incentive and protection of the
author are necessary to secure the benefits for society that copyright can provide. By this
theory, if protection for the author is reduced, the incentive to create works that promote the
progress of science and useful arts is reduced concomitantly; consequently, the purpose of
copyright is frustrated. Principled adherence to the copyright scheme requires that the inter-
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In addition to proclaiming the purpose copyright is to serve, the
Constitution also declares the means by which copyright is to attain
its goal. Progress in the sciences and the useful arts is to be pro-
moted by securing to authors, for a limited time, 7 the exclusive
right to their writings. Copyright offers an incentive to create by
protecting the creation, the ultimate beneficiary of which is society.
Whether the promise of copyright protection adequately and effec-
tively stimulates the progress of science and useful arts has been
questioned thoughtfully,38 but there is little evidence to either corro-
borate or contradict the claim that the copyright system is ineffec-
tive. 9 Nevertheless, a body of law which has existed for over two
centuries, which is paralleled in almost every modern nation in the
world,4" which has not inhibited significantly the publication of
books or journals of varied types and prices,4 and which has the
express endorsement of Congress, is entitled to at least a presump-
tion of validity.
Copyright and the first amendment share similar objectives.
"The central function of copyright-to encourage the formation of,
ests of the author and society be viewed as complementary rather than conflicting. See text
accompanying note 196 infra. See also note 33 supra.
37. The duration of statutory copyright protection is limited. See Copyright Revision Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302-304 (1977). For works created after January 1, 1978, the new Act
provides copyright protection for the author's life, plus an additional fifty years after the
author's death. Id. § 302(a). Thus, under the new statute, there is no threat of copyright in
perpetuity as there was at common law. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § i.10[C], at 8 n.46.
38. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1970). Professor Breyer's article
sparked a written debate. See Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection
for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1100 (1971); Breyer,
Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 75 (1972). See also Henry, Copyright: Its Ade-
quacy in Technological Societies, 186 SCIENCE 993 (1974); Hurt & Schuchman, The Economic
Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. EcoN. REv. 421 (1966).
39. That copyright achieves its ends "is more a political hypothesis than an empirical
certainty." Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 378. See also Seltzer, supra note 5, at
219.
40. Copyright laws of foreign countries are translated and collected in UNESCO, Copy-
RIGHT LAWS AND TRATIEs OF THE WORLD (1956) (supplemented annually). Provisions concern-
ing fair use in the laws of other nations are reviewed in Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 781, 802-07 (A. Fisher ed. 1963).
41. See Seltzer, supra note 5, at 219. "At the very least, copyright cannot easily be seen to
have inhibited the production either of new works of the intellect or of inexpensive books."
Id. "There are in the United States some 429,000 books in print, with some 40,000 new books
being published annually. . . .The Harvard University Library subscribes to 100,000 period-
icals. . . .Paperback titles in print in 1976 numbered some 132,000, with some 13,000 new
paperbacks being issued annually." Id. at 219 n.19 (citations omitted).
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and public participation in, expression-suggests [its] consonance
with first amendment precepts."4 Although both seek the same
end, copyright seeks by actively encouraging what the first amend-
ment seeks by strictly discouraging. "While the First Amendment
facilitates the flow of information by preventing government inter-
vention, the copyright system encourages the development of infor-
mation and its dissemination by providing incentives for publica-
tion. The conflict, if any, is in method not purpose. '43
THE LAW OF FAIR USE
Before the relationship between copyright and the first amend-
ment is analyzed further, a summary of the fair use doctrine is
appropriate. Fair use is an equitable, affirmative defense to a claim
of copyright infringement." In that capacity it functions as "one of
the most important and well-established limitations on the exclu-
sive rights of copyright owners."45 The defense is asserted commonly
by one who claims, in essence, to have made a reasonable use of
copyrighted material. If the user persuades the court that the bal-
ance of equities is in his favor, the use may be excused as fair.46
Insofar as the fair use doctrine is concerned principally with the
rights of a user of copyrighted material rather than with the rights
of a copyright owner, it is solicitous of first amendment values.
A discourse on "fair use" is handicapped by the difficulty inher-
ent in defining the term. The new Copyright Revision Act, which
gives statutory expression to the fair use doctrine for the first time,47
offers no definition. Indeed, the legislative history of the Act asserts
that "no generally applicable definition is possible [because] each
42. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 1001.
43. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 404.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5679 (Fair use "is an equitable rule of reason .
45. Id. at 5678.
46. Striking the proper balance was recognized as an exacting yet essential task by Lord
Mansfield nearly 200 years ago:
We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one,
that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the com-
munity, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenu-
ity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded.
Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 139 n.(b) (K.B. 1785).
47. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 65, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5678.
[Vol. 20:85
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case raising the question must be decided on its own facts."4 The
Act lists a number of factors to be considered in determining
whether the use of a work in a particular case is a fair use:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 9
The fair use provision of the new copyright statute does nothing
more than codify the common law of fair use. Congress admitted as
much: "Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doc-
48: Id. at 5679.
49. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1977). The Act virtually adopts the
factors enumerated by Justice Story in the first American fair use case: "[W]e must...
look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials
used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass.
1841) (No. 4901). Commentators differ as to the criteria relevant to the determination of fair
use. See B. KIPLAN & R. BROwN, CASES ON CoPYiuGhor 341 (2d ed. 1974) ("(1) The nature of
the plaintiffs authorship and intention (e.g. greater protection for a work of imagination, like
a poem, than for a reference book, meant to be used as a source). (2) The status and purpose
of the user (as scholar, reviewer, compiler, or parodist). (3) The extent of the use, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. (4) The effect of the use on the copyright owner's interests.
Is the use competitive or noncompetitive? In either event, is it likely to diminish the value of
the copyright? (5) The absence of intent to plagiarize, especially as evidenced by proper
acknowledgment of the copyrighted source."); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6
ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 53 (1955) ("(1) the type of use involved; (2) the intent with
which it was made; (3) its effect on the original work; (4) the amount of the user's labor
involved; (5) the benefit gained by him; (6) the nature of the works involved; (7) the amount
of material used; and (8) its relative value."); Crossland, The Rise and Fall of Fair Use: The
Protection of Literary Materials Against Copyright Infringement by New and Developing
Media, 20 S.C. L. REv. 153, 183 (1968) ("(1) the nature of plaintiffs material and his inten-
tion, (2) the type and purpose of the use involved, (3) the quantitative extent of material used,
(4) the qualitative extent of material used, (5) the intent with which the material was used,
(6) the effect on the original material, (7) the amount of the user's labor involved, (8) the
benefit to the user, and (9) the manner by which the copying was accomplished."); Yankwich,
What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 203, 213 (1954) ("(1) the quantity and importance of
the portions taken; (2) their relation to the work of which they are a part; (3) the result of
their use upon the demand for the copyrighted publication."). It has been suggested that the
most important factor to be considered is "whether the use tends to interfere with the sale of
the copyrighted article." Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590
(S.D.N.Y. 1965) (citations omitted).
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trine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way."5
Thus, without any attempt to change an area of the law thoroughly
mired in confusion and contradiction, Congress incorporated the
entire body of judicially-made law concerning fair use.5'
One is less inclined to reproach the draftsmen of section 107 in
view of the failure of the courts and commentators to formulate a
satisfactory definition of fair use. Whether fair use is a privileged
infringement of copyright or, rather, a noninfringing use is the sub-
ject of some debate. Justice Story adopted the latter viewpoint,
arguing that a fair use is a justifiable use which the law recognizes
as no infringement of copyright. 52 A leading commentator disagrees:
"The effect of the fair use defense is to excuse otherwise infringing
conduct. . . . ",5 This distinction is subtle and may be of no practi-
cal significance. 4 An often quoted definition perhaps derives its
popularity from its avoidance of the issue: "Fair use [is] a privilege
in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted mate-
rial in a reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding
the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright. 55
The proposition concerning fair use that is generally accepted is
that "it is not easy to decide what is and what is not a fair use."56
50. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5680.
51. See Seltzer, supra note 5, at 230-31:
If the purpose of a statutory definition of fair use is to articulate a coherent
rationale for public policy, to indicate the general principles that follow from
such a policy, and to establish or to refine a standard that will help courts in
dealing with particular determinations of what they have long agreed, along
with Judge Learned Hand, are "the most troublesome ii the whole law of copy-
right," then the treatment of the issue in the new Copyright Act is very nearly
a total loss.
Id. (quoting Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939)).
52. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 342, 348-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
53. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 1011. Professor Nimmer concurs:
[The] problem [of fair use] arises where it is established by admission or by
the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has copied sufficiently
from the plaintiff so as to cross the line of substantial similarity. The result must
necessarily constitute an infringement unless the defendant is rendered immune
from liability because the particular use which he has made of plaintiff's mate-
rial is a 'fair use.' In this more meaningful sense fair use is a defense not because
of the absence of substantial similarity but rather despite the fact that the
similarity is substantial.
3 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 13.05, at 13-50; see text accompanying note 195 infra.
54. Cohen, supra note 46, at 48.
55. H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY § 125, at 260 (1944).
56. Cohen, supra note 46, at 52.
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The question has been called "the most troublesome in the whole
law of copyright."57 The truthfulness of these characterizations is
evidenced by the Supreme Court's division on the issue; twice the
issue of fair use has been presented to the Supreme Court and in
each case the lower court decision was affirmed, without opinion, by
an equally divided Court. "A single doctrine that has forced the
Court to divide equally twice can claim some measure of diffi-
culty."59
With this lack of consensus about the definition of fair use, it is
not surprising that authorities differ as to its purpose. Three pri-
mary rationales have been advanced for the fair use doctrine. The
foremost justification is based on the constitutional purpose for
granting copyright protection, to promote the progress of science
and useful arts." Closely related is the opinion that reasonable,
customary, or necessary uses of copyrighted works must be allowed
to advance the public welfare. ' A third justification for fair use is
based on the theory of implied consent; a copyright owner impliedly
57. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). Referring
to the issue of fair use, Justice Story commented: "This is one of those intricate and embar-
rassing questions. . . in which it is not. . easy to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or
to lay down any general principles applicable to all cases. . . ... Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. 342,
344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). This view has been echoed frequently. See, e.g., Marvin
Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (the bounda-
ries of the fair use doctrine are "exceptionally elusive even for the law"); Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ("The doctrine is. . .so flexible
as virtually to defy definition.").
58. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (Blackmun, J., abstained); Benny v. Loew's Inc.,
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Columbia Broadcast-
ing Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (Douglas, J., abstained). The Court again
declined to consider the issue of fair use in its most recent opportunity. Meeropol v. Nizer,
560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
59. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 379.
60. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). "To serve that purpose, 'courts in passing upon particular
claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a
maximum financial return to the greater public interest in the development of art, science
and industry."' Id. (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)); see Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,
1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 375 (1975); Greenbie v. Noble,
151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
61. See, e.g., Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587, 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271 (Ch. 1761); H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPY-
RIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). See also Rosenfield, Customary Use as "Fair Use"
in Copyright Law, 25 BUFFALO L. Ray. 119 (1975).
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consents to uses of his work which are fair.62
The fair use doctrine has been examined thoroughly elsewhere. 3
It is sufficient to note that although fair use is established as "a
basic tenet of our copyright system,"64 there is considerable uncer-
tainty about the definition of fair use and its intended purpose. This
confusion tends to divert attention from the most important consid-
eration, the meaning of a judgment of fair use: no liability can be
imposed for a fair use of copyrighted material.
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE CONFLICT
Conflict between copyright and the first amendment is perceived
primarily in two instances. In the first, copyright is used not "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts" but to impede the
dissemination of information. In the second, the distinction between
an idea and its expression is poorly defined, and a copyright proprie-
tor, claiming the exclusive right to his expression, successfully can
block access to his ideas as well. A review of the subtleties of these
conflicts reveals that the perceived threat to the first amendment
from the misuse of copyright is largely illusory; the second conflict,
in which protection of the expression may preclude the use of the
idea, poses more significant dangers.
Misuse of Copyright: Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House,
Inc. 6 5
Rosemont Enterprises was a Nevada corporation organized in late
1965. Its sole stockholders were Howard Hughes' attorney and two
officers of the Hughes Tool Company. Rosemont obtained, by con-
tract with Hughes, the exclusive right to publish Hughes' life story.66
62. See, e.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (1st Cir.
1905); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa.
1938); 3 NiMMER, supra note 17, § 13.05 ("It is sometimes suggested that fair use is predicated
on the implied or tacit consent of the author.").
63. See, e.g., H. BALL, supra note 55, §§ 124-128; 3 NImmER, supra note 17, § 13.05; Cohen,
supra note 49; Crossland, supra note 49; Latman, supra note 40; Seltzer, supra note 5, at 230-
60; Yankwich, supra note 49; Note, Fair Use: A Controversial Topic in the Latest Revision
of Our Copyright Law, 34 U. CN. L. REv. 73 (1965); Comment, Copyright Fair Use-Case
Law and Legislation, 1969 DuKE L.J. 73.
64. Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IowA L. REv 832, 832
(1968).
65. 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
66. Id. at 312 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
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Soon thereafter, on May 20, 1966, Rosemont acquired the copyrights
for a series of Look magazine articles about Hughes. These articles
had been used in preparing a forthcoming Random House publica-
tion, Howard Hughes-A Biography. Random House was warned
that Hughes objected to the biography and would "make trouble"
if it were published. 7 On May 26, six days after obtaining the Look
copyrights, Rosemont brought an action for copyright infringement
against Random House."8 Rosemont sought damages and an injunc-
tion restraining the publication, distribution, and sale of the Ran-
dom House book.69
That Random House had copied portions of the Look articles, the
most authoritative reports ever written on Howard Hughes, 7 could
not be denied. The Random House biography contained 250 words
of direct quotation, about eighty words concededly paraphrased,
and at least a dozen other instances of obvious paraphrase.7 ' In
total, Rosemont itemized forty-one separate instances of copying
and claimed a total appropriation of fourteen percent of the Look
articles.72
The district court found infringement and granted the injunctive
relief sought by Rosemont.78 Determinative of its decision was the
court's finding that Random House's copying of the Look articles
"was substantial in both the quantative and qualitative sense. 7
The court refused to accept Random House's defense of fair use,
reasoning that the defense "is limited to cases where [the] copy-
righted material is used for purposes of criticism or comment or in
67. Id. at 305.
68. Id.
69. 256 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
70. See id. at 59. The articles were so characterized by a senior Random House editor. Id.
71. Id. at 61.
72. Id. at 61-62. The Look articles contain roughly 13,500 words; the Random House biogra-
phy is 304 pages comprised of approximately 116,000 words. Id. at 59-60.
73. Id. at 68.
74. Id. at 64. Also important to the court's decision were the purposes for which the
copyrighted material was used and the defendant's lack of independent research. Id. at 66.
The finding by the lower court is in striking contrast to that of the court of appeals, which
noted that although some copying had occurred, "[a] mere reading of the Look articles...
indicates that there is considerable doubt as to whether the copied and paraphrased matter
constitutes a material and substantial portion of those articles." 366 F.2d at 306. This "mere
reading" test employed by the appellate court is significantly less rigorous than the infringe-
ment analysis used by the district court. See 256 F. Supp. at 60. Both courts treated the
claims of infringement and fair use as separate issues; the opinions reveal two different tests
for infringement and two different conceptions of fair use.
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scholarly works of scientific or educational value. '75 If the borrowing
work does not fall into these categories, the right to assert fair use
is limited severely. 76 The Random House biography did not qualify
as a scholarly publication; on the contrary, it was a "lively, fast
moving" account of the life of Howard Hughes, "designed for the
popular market. '77
Within two months the decision of the district court was reversed
and the injunction vacated. 78 The court of appeals accepted Ran-
dom House's argument that the trial court erred, as a matter of law,
by narrowly confining the fair use privilege "to scholarly works writ-
ten and prepared for scholarly audiences. ' 79 The appellate court
explained that a book need not be scholarly to commend itself to
the attention of the public:
Whether an author . . . is motivated in part by a desire for
commercial gain, or 'whether [his publication] is designed for the
popular market. . . has no bearing on whether a public benefit
may be derived ftom such a work. . . . All publications presum-
ably are operated for profit . . . . [B]oth commercial and artis-
tic elements are involved in almost every work. 0
The eminent reasonableness of this position has been confirmed
by the commercial speech cases, 81 in which the Supreme Court con-
ceded that profit-motivated speech may be beneficial to the public.
Recognition of this fact particularly is appropriate in the law of
copyright, which is premised on the notion that an economic incen-
75. 256 F. Supp. at 66 (citations omitted). The court's position is not without support. Fair
use traditionally was confined primarily "to cases where the material is appropriated either
for purposes of criticism, comment, or scholarship; or where the appropriated work is used
in a purely incidental manner in the borrowing work." Note, Parody and Copyright
Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. Rav. 585, 594 (1956) (footnotes omitted). "The defense of fair use
is most universally recognized in connection with the function of criticism, and review." 3
NimmER, supra note 17, § 13.05[B], at 13-57. Closely related is the recognition of the defense
where the "defendant's work is used for educational, scientific, or historical purposes." Id. §
13.05[AI[1]. See also Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 389-90.
76. 256 F. Supp. at 66.
77. Id.
78. 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966).
79. Id. at 306.
80. Id. at 307 (citations omitted).
81. E.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S.
809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
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tive often is necessary to, stimulate the creation of works which
advance the progress of science and the useful arts.12 The Rosemont
decision added dimensions to the law of fair use by acknowledging
that commercial speech is not necessarily bereft of value.
The court of appeals' opinion in Rosemont has received both criti-
cal acclaim 3 and strong criticism. 4 Chief Judge Lumbard's concur-
ring opinion has caused controversy because of its interpretation of
Howard Hughes' actual objectives. Judge Lumbard, joined by
Judge Hays, focused on the suspicious sequence of events leading
to the organization of Rosemont, its staffing by Hughes' employees,
its acquisition of the exclusive right to publish Hughes' biography
and the copyrights in the Look articles, and Rosemont's subsequent
suit against Random House.8" The implication of these facts was
clear to Chief Judge Lumbard: the Look copyrights were purchased
solely to bring the lawsuit against Random House.86 "Hughes
wanted nothing written about himself, the publication of which he
could not control. The Rosemont Corporation was created to this
end. The purchase of the Look copyright was a part of Hughes' plan
to prevent the publication of a biography.""
Chief Judge Lumbard's characterization of Hughes' conduct
raises the spectre of censorship by suggesting that a copyright might
be misused to restrict the dissemination of information and to sup-
press speech. Unfortunately, the veracity of his suggestion was never
82. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
83. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 62 n.72; Schulman, supra note 64, at 833.
84. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 387-88 (The court used "too large a weapon
for too small a prey."); Seltzer, supra note 5, at 254-55 (The "copying involved could be
justified neither on First Amendment grounds nor on fair use grounds."); Sobel, supra note
20, at 76 (The Rosemont decision "rode roughshod over the copyright law and permitted what
amounted to nothing less than wholesale theft."). The criticism centers primarily on the fact
that the defendants were exonerated from liability, even though they availed themselves not
only of the facts contained in the Look articles but also of the expression of those facts. For
reasons advanced in the text accompanying notes 204-205 infra, a judgment in favor of
Rosemont and a minimal damage award were warranted. Despite justified criticism of the
court's opinion in Rosemont, the decision nevertheless contributed immensely to the law of
copyright.
85. 366 F.2d at 313 (Lumbard, C.J., concurring).
86. Id.
87. Id. (footnote omitted). Chief Judge Lumbard reinforced his conclusion by noting that
Rosemont purchased the copyrights of several other works about Hughes. The copyright to
Adela Rogers St. Johns' article, The Howard Hughes Story, was acquired by Rosemont. Id.
at n.5. Rosemont also bought an unpublished manuscript from an author who had been
commissioned to write a Hughes' biography. Id. at 313.
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addressed by the court. In general, a copyright proprietor could not
accomplish such an end by virture of his copyright."8 Copyright
protection extends only to an author's choice of words and style in
expressing facts; it does not extend to the facts themselves, or,
under the new Act, "to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery. . .. "s' How-
ard Hughes could have aggregated the copyrights of every article
and book ever written about him. By virtue of such ownership,
however, he could have prevented only the unlawful appropriation
of expression.
"The Wedding of Expressing and Idea":"' Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis
Associates"'
Time Inc., which had secured a copyright in the Zapruder film of
the Kennedy assassination, brought an action for statutory copy-
right infringement against the author, Josiah Thompson, and the
publisher, Bernard Geis Associates, of Six Seconds in Dallas. A
study of the Kennedy assassination, the book challenges the lone-
assassin conclusion reached by the Warren Commission. Thompson
was convinced that the use of several frames from the Zapruder film
was indispensible to the effective presentation of his book. Accord-
ingly, he sought Time's permission to reprint specified frames. Re-
peated requests for permission brought repeated refusals. Bernard
Geis finally offered Time a royalty equal to the profits received from
publication of Thompson's book in exchange for a license to use the
88. But see Professor Goldstein's thoughtful article:
Implicit in the statutory monopoly is the copyright owner's right to withhold his
expression from the public. A consequence of this basic right of the owner is his
right to delimit the size and economic status of the audience to which the work
shall be disseminated by specification of the number and price of the copies to
be sold. As the public is restricted in its participation only to those copies
authorized, its right to hear, to read, and to view may, at the author's instance,
be sharply curtailed.
...The holder of an enterprise monopoly [an aggregation of copyrights]
. ..has not only the negative power to withhold expression; he has an addi-
tional, affirmative power to provide-for the broad dissemination of copyrighted
material consistent in principle with his own social, political, and economic
views.
Goldstein, supra note 19, at 989-90 (emphasis supplied).
89. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (1977); see notes 11-12 supra &
accompanying text.
90. 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[C][2].
91. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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desired frames.2 This offer also was refused. Thompson and Ber-
nard Geis resolved to copy a number of frames despite the lack of
Time's consent; significant parts of twenty-two copyrighted frames
were reproduced in Six Seconds in Dallas."
In response to Time's charge of copyright infringement Thompson
and Bernard Geis asserted the defense of fair use. 4 The court found
that Time had complied with the requisite statutory formalities in
registering the film at the Copyright Office," that the Zapruder film
was properly the subject of copyright," and that the defendants had
92. Id. at 138.
93. Id. at 139. Perhaps in anticipation of an infringement action, the defendants did not
reproduce the frame photographically. Instead, they hired an artist to make sketches of the
frames. Id. at 138. The representations were so detailed and authentic that they were "in fact
copies,. . . with no creativity or originality whatever." Id. at 139. Bernard Geis admitted as
much in an introductory note to Six Seconds in Dallas, in which the reader is asked to
compare the sketches with a photographic reproduction of one of the Zapruder frames; the
comparison, it is asserted, will confirm that the sketches are so accurate that "their represen-
tation of the events is exact." Id.
94. Id. at 132.
95. Id. at 137.
96. Id. at 141-44. The court was persuaded that the Zapruder film displayed sufficient
originality and creativity to distinguish it from mere fact and, therefore, concluded that it
was copyrightable. "Zapruder selected the kind of camera. . ., the kind of film. . ., the kind
of lens. . ., the area in which the pictures were to be taken,. .. and. . . the spot on which
the camera would be operated." Id. at 143.
The question of the copyrightability of pictures was addressed by the Supreme Court in
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (Holmes, J.). In holding that
three chromolithographs were subject to copyright, the Court stated: "Personality always
contains something unique. It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very mod-
est grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That something he
may copyright unless there is a restriction in the words of the act." Id. at 250; accord,
Jewelers' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 274 F. 932,934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(L. Hand, J.) ("No photograph, however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence
of the author, and no two will be absolutely alike."). The proposition that photographs are
entitled to copyright protection is no longer questioned. See Copyright Revision Act of 1976,
17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (1977). See also 1 NwbMun, supra note 17, § 2.08[E]; Gorman, supra
note 11, at 1596-1600.
Although photographs are copyrightable, it remains debatable whether a historical and
evidentiary document such as the Zapruder film should be subject to copyright. The practical
reality of copyright registration, however, dictates that a court focus on the scope of copyright
protection and not on the propriety of that protection. In fiscal 1976, for example, the Copy-
right Office registered 410,969 copyrights, which is roughly 1,125 per calendar day. Annual
Report of the Register of Copyrights for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1976. Patent laws
require a pre-issuance evaluation by the patent office. Copyrights, to the contrary, are of
necessity issued without an extensive examination. The volume of application for copyrights
is so large that works are checked for little more than compliance with statutory formalities.
"[Tihe examiner does not and cannot investigate at large; he generally confines himself to
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in fact copied some of the film. From these bare findings the court
concluded: "[T]here is thus an infringement by [the] defendants
unless the use of the copyrighted material in the [blook is a 'fair
use' outside the limits of copyright protection."97
Considering whether the defense of fair use was available to the
defendants, the court recognized that "[t]here is a public interest
in having the fullest information available on the murder of Presi-
dent Kennedy.""8 Equally important was the court's finding that
there was "little, if any, injury to [the] plaintiff, the copyright
owner"99 because the market for the Zapruder film was not jeopard-
ized. °0 These findings prompted the court to conclude that the bal-
ance of the equities favored the defendants. 01
The Bernard Geis case prompted a vigorous warning from Profes-
sor Nimmer: "[a] grave danger to copyright may lie in the failure
to distinguish between the statutory privilege known as fair use, and
an emerging constitutional limitation on copyright contained in the
First Amendment.''10 This statement suggests that while "the Con-
stitution is permissive"'0 3 with respect to congressional authority to
extend copyright protection, it is not wholly permissive. At some
point the Constitution itself limits the exclusive rights of authors.
In Professor Nimmer's view, the first amendment limitation on co-
pyright must be distinguished from fair use, a statutory construct
which is based on whether "the defendants' work tends to diminish
or prejudice the potential sale of the plaintiffs work."'0 4 Contrary
to the fair use defense, the first amendment privilege "may be in-
voked despite the fact that the marketability of the copied work is
. . . impaired." 105
Professor Nimmer, together with his disciple Lionel Sobel, be-
the application and the deposited copies ... ." Kaplan, The Registration of Copyright, in
1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 325, 361 (A. Fisher ed. 1963).
97. 293 F. Supp. at 144.
98. Id. at 146.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 1 NIMMEa, supra note 17, § 1.10[D], at 1-85.
103. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972); accord, Bobbs-
Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908); American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207
U.S. 284, 298 (1907); cf. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 698 (1834) (copyright is a
statutory privilege).
104. 2 NIMmER, supra note 17, § 13.05, at 646.
105. 1 id. § 1.10[D], at 1-85.
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lieves that the Bernard Geis case is irreconcilable as a fair use deci-
sion."'6 In Professor Nimmer's judgment, the court concluded incor-
rectly that the value of the copyright on the Zapruder film was not
damaged. The court acknowledged, and then ignored, that Time
had planned to use the film in a movie or a book; then without
analysis, the court termed the effect of the defendants' use on those
plans "speculative."'0 Considering that Six Seconds in Dallas con-
tained copies of fifty-five percent of the frames of the Zapruder film
depicting the actual shooting of President Kennedy,' it is reasona-
ble to suppose that the book measurably satisfied the demand for a
future work based on the Zapruder film. Certainly Time's allegation
of harm to an invaluable corporate asset, in which it had invested
$150,000,19 demanded a more thoughtful inquiry by the court.
Although criticizing the Bernard Geis decision because it was
based on fair use, Professor Nimmer acknowledged, albeit begrudg-
ingly, that the judgment for the defendants was defensible due to
the free speech elements of the Zapruder film."0 Professor Nimmer's
analysis deserves careful consideration because he identifies with
precision and insight the circumstances in which there exists a po-
tential for conflict between copyright and the first amendment.
The court in Bernard Geis never addressed directly the question
of the defendants' need to use the Zapruder film in their book.
Although it described the film as "an historic document and un-
doubtably the most important photographic evidence" of the assas-
sination,"' the court asserted that Time "claim[ed] no copyright
in the events at Dallas;" rather, it claimed "copyright in the partic-
ular form of expression of the Zapruder film."" 2 As Professor Nim-
mer explained, to capture the idea of the film reproduction of its
expression was necessary:
[I]n the welter of conflicting versions of what happened that
tragic day in Dallas, the Zapruder film gave the public authorita-
106. Id. § 1.10[D]; Sobel, supra note 20, at 61.
107. 293 F. Supp. at 146.
108. The Zapruder film contains approximately 480 frames. Of these, "140 show the imme-
diate events of the shooting and 40 are relevant to the shots themselves." Id. at 133. The
defendant's book reproduced significant parts of 22 copyrighted frames. Id. at 139.
109. Id. at 134.
110. 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[D], at 1-86.
111. 293 F. Supp. at 131.
112. Id. at 143.
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tive answers that it desparately sought; answers that no other
source could supply with equal credibility . . . . [I]t was only
the expression, not the idea alone, that could adequately serve
the needs of an enlightened democratic dialogue."3
The inability to reprint selected frames of the Zapruder film, of
course, would not have precluded the defendants from writing
about the Kennedy assassination. Nevertheless, in order for
Thompson to present satisfactorily his theory of conspiracy, use of
the film was essential. No writer, however skilled, can convey the
idea of the Zapruder film as well as the film itself. The first amend-
ment commands that access to and dissemination of ideas be unin-
hibited. Because of the unique nature of the Zapruder film, copy-
right protection of its expression threatened to impede access to its
idea.
In Bernard Geis, the court was confronted with one of the most
difficult sets of facts that can arise in a copyright infringement suit.
The defendants' book about the Kennedy assassination clearly com-
mended itself to the reading public, and the preparation of the book
necessitated the use of certain frames of the Zapruder film. Yet the
film's reproduction also caused a substantial likelihood of harm to
the value of Time's copyright. This potential damage to marketabil-
ity should have precluded a finding of fair use. Because the idea
contained in the Zapruder film is inseparable from its expression,
the first amendment required that the defendants' use of the film
be permitted."4 This requirement implicates the delicate question:
did the first amendment demand also that injury to the plaintiff's
copyright go without remedy?
In distinguishing fair use from the "emerging constitutional limi-
113. 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[C], at 1-83. Professor Nimmer emphasized his point
with another example that concerned copyright of the photographs of the My Lai massacre:
No amount of words describing the "idea" of the massacre could substitute for
the public insight gained through the photographs. [Use of the] photographic
expression, not merely the idea, [was] essential if the public was to fully under-
stand what occurred in that tragic episode. It would be intolerable if the public's
comprehension of the full meaning of My Lai could be censored by the copyright
owner of the photographs.
Id. at 1-82.
114. But cf. Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 20, at 389 (suggesting that the Bernard
Gels controversy is capable of resolution "without raising the more difficult issues of constitu-
tional dimensions"). To the contrary, the constitutional dimensions of the case must be
recognized and addressed squarely.
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tation on copyright contained in the First Amendment,"11 5 Professor
Nimmer asserted:
Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others
which does not materially impair the marketability of the work
which is copied. The First Amendment privilege, when appropri-
ate, may be invoked despite the fact that the marketability of the
copied work is thereby imparied.116
Professor Nimmer's regard for the first amendment is laudable; the
troubling aspect of his statement is its implication that the first
amendment, sensitive to the public interest in uninhibited debate,
is indifferent to a demonstrable private injury. The first amendment
is not so inflexible. If a conflict between public and private interests
is irreconcilable, the interests of the public must prevail. The con-
flict between copyright and the first amendment, however, permits
a middle course: judicial determination of a reaonable royalty.11
The search for a proper remedy in a case like Bernard Geis is
impeded by the assumption of an infringement's inherent perni-
ciousness. 15 Moreover, traditional infringement remedies, such as
injunctive relief, impoundment of infringing articles, and recovery
of profits,"' are too strict to complement the first amendment. The
115. 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[D], at 1-85.
116. Id.
117. Credit for the concept of reasonable royalty goes, paradoxically, to Professor Nimmer.
1 NnMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[C], at 1-84. It is unclear, however, whether Professor
Nimmer would call for the award of a reasonable royalty in Bernard Geis. On the one hand,
Professor Nimmer argues that the holding of fair use was untenable because of his belief that
the value of Time's copyright was damaged by use of the Zapruder film, a conclusion that
cannot be reconciled with his view that a finding of fair use is inappropriate if "the defen-
dant's work tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of the plaintiff's work." Id. §
13.05. On the other hand, Professor Nimmer notes that the holding in Bernard Geis may be
defensible if at all because of the "free speech elements" in the Zapruder film. Id. § 1.10[D],
at 1-86. This opinion comports with his statement that "[t]he First Amendment privilege,
when appropriate, may be invoked despite the fact that the marketability of the copied work
is. . .impaired." Id. at 1-85.
118. See Goldstein, supra note 19, at 1056. See also KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 78. "[Wlhen
copyright has gone wrong in recent times, it has been by taking itself too seriously, by foolish
assumptions about the amount of originality open to man as an artificer, by sanctimonious
pretensions about the iniquities of imitation." Id.
119. The new Act affords a variety of remedies for infringement, including injunctive relief,
impoundment of infringing articles, actual damages, profits, statutory damages, and criminal
penalties. Copyright Revision Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 502-506 (1977). See generally 2
NIMMER, supra note 17, §§ 14.01 to 14.10; Strauss, The Damage Provisions of the Copyright
Law, in 2 STUDIES ON CoPYmGHT 995 (A. Fisher ed. 1963); Strauss, Remedies Other than
Damages for Copyright Infringement, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1029 (A. Fisher ed. 1963).
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use of the Zapruder film by the defendants in Bernard Geis elicits
sympathy; a thief who takes only what he needs, particularly after
asking first, is no ordinary pirate. Yet, use of the film added to the
authenticity and appeal, and thus to the marketability, of Six Sec-
onds in Dallas. Although one may be disinclined to contend that
Time suffered a wrong, one may more willingly acknowledge the
injury to the value of Time's copyright. In these circumstances the
need is not for punishment but for equity. The award of a reasonable
royalty' permits partial accommodation of the interests of both
litigants without compromising first amendment concerns;12" ' it also
pays adequate tribute to society's interest in a sound copyright sys-
tem.
What is most disturbing about the Bernard Geis case is not the
conclusion reached by the court but the way in which the court
arrived at that conclusion. The court never identified expressly nor
assessed systematically the competing interests and the underlying
policies of copyright. These shortcomings are common in many fair
use cases, resulting in inconsistent and unpredictable decisions. A
court of equity must be free to seek fairness. What is needed in the
law of copyright is not less flexibility but better-reasoned rules and
principles to guide courts in their difficult task of achieving justice.
120. Fixing a reasonable royalty admittedly requires an ambitious calculation by the court,
yet such awards are not uncommon in tort and antitrust litigation. The rule that precludes
recovery of uncertain and speculative damages applies only when "the fact of damage is itself
uncertain." Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 688 (1946). Once harm is
established, the inability of the claimant to furnish an exact measure of damage will not
defeat the right of recovery. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264
(1946). To insist on ascertainment of the damages with certaifity once harm is shown "would
be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person,
and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts." Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931). Damages are sufficiently
certain "if a reasonable basis of computation is afforded, although the result be only approxi-
mate." Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
Courts long have distinguished the fact of damage from the amount of damage. In general,
uncertainty as to the fact of damage is fatal to recovery but uncertainty as to the amount is
not. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 23, 26, 27 (1935). In Bernard Geis, despite the
possibility of significant damage to the value of Time's copyright, the court found the defen-
dants' use to be fair, leaving an injured party totally without relief.
121. Too large an award of damages, however, may have a chilling effect on the exercise
of free speech. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times,
the Court declared that "[t]he fear of damage awards. . . may be markedly more inhibiting
than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute." Id. at 277.
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Constitutional Fair Use: Meeropol v. Nizer 12
Michael and Robert Meeropol, the sons of Ethel and Julius Ro-
senberg, brought an action against Louis Nizer, author of The Im-
plosion Conspiracy, Doubleday & Company, Inc., the hardcover
book's publisher, and Fawcett Publications, Inc., the paperback
book's publisher. 123 The Meeropols alleged statutory copyright in-
fringement of letters written by their parents and published in their
copyrighted book, Death House Letters of Ethel and Julius
Rosenberg.'24 In The Implosion Conspiracy, Nizer reprinted verba-
tim portions of twenty-eight copyrighted letters. The quoted ex-
cerpts totaled 1957 words, less than one percent of The Implosion
Conspiracy and slightly less than three percent of Death House
Letters. 125 The Meeropols sought a permanent injunction restraining
the defendants from publishing and selling The Implosion
Conspiracy and an impoundment of all unsold copies of the book.
12
At the district court, the defendants asserted the defense of fair
use. 127 The court applied the fair use analysis outlined in Rosemont:
122. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978).
123. The initial complaint, filed June 19, 1973, in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, named only Nizer and Doubleday as defendants. Eight
months later, on March 6, 1974, the Meeropols commenced a separate action against Fawcett
Publications in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. In an unre-
ported opinion, the federal district court for the Southern District of New York granted
Fawcett's motion to stay the Connecticut action and intervene in the original action. Meero-
pol v. Nizer, No. 74-1587 (S.D.N.Y. April 3, 1974), affl'd, 505 F.2d 232, 234-35 (2d Cir. 1974).
124. 505 F.2d at 234 & n.1. The Meeropols also charged libel, invasion of privacy, and
common law infringement of copyright. The libel and privacy claims were dismissed on a
motion for summary judgment. 381 F. Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The claim for common law
copyright infringement was dismissed without discussion. 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Both dismissals were affirmed. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
125. 417 F. Supp. at 1206. More precisely, the quoted excerpts comprised .85% of The
Implosion Conspiracy's total of 228,900 words and 2.4% of Death House Letters' total of
80,000 words. Id.
126. See 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). At trial, the plaintiffs reduced their
demands to seek only an injunction against the book's paperback publication and the sale of
television or movie rights, and they requested impoundment of the hardbound copies remain-
ing in the defendant's inventory. Id. at 1067.
127. Id. at 1065. Nizer and Doubleday also contended that the letters were in the public
domain, that the Meeropols did not hold valid copyright, and that the action was barred by
laches. Id. The defendants may be correct in their assertion that the Rosenberg letters were
not and were never intended to be private correspondence. Death House Letters was pub-
lished several days before the Rosenbergs were executed, specifically to generate funds and
call attention to the alleged injustice of their conviction. See Petitioners' Brief for Certiorari
at 4-5, Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Petition for
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whether distribution of the allegedly infringing work is in the public
interest and whether preparation of the work required use of the
copyrighted materials. 28 The court found the first element of the
Rosemont test satisfied because of "the continuing interest in and
importance of the celebrated Rosenberg case" and because The
Implosion Conspiracy was a valuable source contributing to the
debate. 2 19 The second criterion was deemed satisfied because "resort
to quotations of certain of the Rosenbergs' letters is important to
any serious book on their trial."'30
Despite its conclusion that The Implosion Conspiracy adequately
satisfied Rosemont's fair use criteria, the court denied the defen-
dants' cross-motion to dismiss the complaint. 31 Judgment was re-
served on the question of infringement to allow the Meeropols to
introduce additional evidence on the nature of the letters32 and the
impact of their use on the value of Death House Letters. The court
also expressed concern that Nizer had made only an insincere at-
tempt to obtain permission to cite the letters, although both Nizer,
a lawyer, and his publisher were aware of the potential copyright
infringement. 33
At the second trial 34 on the expanded record, before Judge Gag-
liardi, the defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint. The
Meeropols contended that summary judgment was inappropriate
because material issues of fact existed concerning (1) whether the
fair use doctrine applied to a book such as The Implosion
Conspiracy, (2) the quantitative and qualitative significance of the
copied material to Nizer's book, and (3) the effect of Nizer's use of
the Rosenberg letters on the market for the copyrighted work, Death
Certiorari]. See also Preface to R. & M. MEEROPOL, WE ARE YOUR SONS at xii (1975) ("Our
parents came to realize that their correspondence could be utilized as aids in the campaign
to save them.").
128. 361 F. Supp. at 1068 (citing Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366
F.2d at 307).
129. Id. at 1068.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1070. At the same time the court refused the Meeropols' request for temporary
injunctive relief because they failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and
because the balance of potential harm favored the defendants. Id.
132. Id. The court was unsure whether "letters stand on the same footing as 'historical
facts', which are the product of research and in turn form the basis for subsequent works."
Id.
133. Id.
134. 417 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Gagliardi, J.).
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House Letters. 5
The court had little difficulty dismissing the Meeropols first argu-
ment. In the original trial Judge Tyler had found that The Implo-
sion Conspiracy, "a serious, full and readable account" of the con-
troversial Rosenberg-Sobell espionage case, was of considerable
public interest."8 Judge Tyler also noted that the sale of The Implo-
sion Conspiracy "as a trade book for commercial gain" was insuffi-
cient reason to deny the defense of fair use.13 Judge Gagliardi
agreed, adding that a work may lack substantial scholarship and
nevertheless be of interest to the public. 18 Therefore, the purpose
of copyright, to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
should be construed broadly.139 To satisfy this purpose a work need
only confer "some benefit to the public at large," ' a minimal stan-
dard easily surpassed by The Implosion Conspiracy.
More problematic to the court was the Meerpol's second conten-
tion, that use of the Rosenberg letters in the The Implosion
Conspiracy was quantitatively and qualitatively substantial. The
quoted excerpts constituted less than one percent of Nizer's book,
135. Id. at 1207.
136. 361 F. Supp. at 1068.
137. Id. The Meeropols challenged the earlier decision on both counts, claiming that the
defendants could not avail themselves of the defense of fair use until the credibility of The
Implosion Conspiracy as an historical work was established. 417 F. Supp. at 1208. Fourteen
affidavits from various authorities on the Rosenberg trial were submitted to show that Nizer's
book is "riddled with distortions and inaccuracies and thus [of] no historical value." Id.
A review critical of The Implosion Conspiracy was written by John Henry Faulk, a former
client of Nizer's: "Mr. Louis Nizer, a distinguished New York trial lawyer, has written a book
about one of this century's most controversial trials . . . . I am sorry he did . . . . [H]is
book is so hopelessly flawed that it does a sad disservice to his talents as an attorney." Faulk,
Book Review, 51 Tax. L. Rav. 1026, 1026 (1973). Nizer's book has received a large share of
favorable comment as well. See, e.g., Wilkes, Book Review, 8 GA. L. Rxv. 279, 279 (1973)
("Nizer has produced a book which is not only a brilliant analysis of an important judicial
proceeding but also a stunning human drama.").
It is worth remembering that the question before the court was not the quality of Nizer's
book but his right to use the copyrighted letters. The district court in the second Meeropol
opinion noted:
[P]laintiff's voluminous and vehement submission [of affidavits critical of The
Implosion Conspiracy] gives the distinct impression that what is really desired
is a trial of the accuracy and fairness of defendants' book and its implicit
conclusion that the controversial Rosenberg trial was fair-an issue on which
history alone must provide the final judgment. ...
417 F. Supp. at 1208.
138. Id. at 1208-09.
139. See id. at 1209.
140. Id.; see text accompanying notes 203-05 infra.
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an amount which the court described as "more than insignifi-
cant."'' Use of the letters, moreover, may have been essential be-
cause the thoughts and feelings expressed by the Rosenbergs in their
letters were inseparable from the letters themselves.' Nevertheless,
the court concluded that the letters did not form a major part of
Nizer's work4 3 and, therefore, that their use was not "qualitatively
or quantitatively substantial in the context of the entire work."'"
The court briefly addressed the Meeropols' final argument, that
The Implosion Conspiracy had damaged the market for the Rosen-
berg letters.4 5 Although the court noted that "not one iota of evi-
dence" had been produced to substantiate this claim, it conceded
that the plaintiffs might be able to prove such damage at trial.'4"
Moreover, harm to the copyright owner, in Judge Gagliardi's view
is not decisive of the fair use question. "While the impairment of
the commercial value of the copyrighted work is a factor to be con-
sidered, a copy may be sufficiently limited or otherwise privileged
so as to be entitled to fair use protection.' '147
The court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding
that fair use had been established as a matter of law. According to
the court, the undisputed facts were so overwhelming "that a rea-
sonable jury could [only] reach the conclusion that the copying
s . .is... entitled to fair use protection."'' The court, however,
had acknowledged earlier in the opinion that the issue of the quali-
tative significance of the Rosenberg letters to The Implosion
Conspiracy, a factual issue central to the fair use defense, was a
point over which reasonable men may disagree.'
On appeal, the Second Circuit"' objected to Judge Gagliardi's
application of fair use law: "It was error to hold that as a matter of
law the fair use defense was available to [the] defendants when the
purpose for which the letters were included in the book and the
effect of the use of the copyrighted letters on their future market
141. 417 F. Supp. at 1212-13.
142. Id. at 1212.
143. Id. at 1213.
144. Id. at 1214.
145. Id. at 1209-10.
146. Id. at 1210.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1214.
149. Id. at 1210-11.
150. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977).
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were in dispute.""'' In the court of appeals' view, further examina-
tion of the reasons why Nizer used the letters in his book was neces-
sary. If the letters were used predominately for scholarly or histori-
cal reasons, '52 fair use properly would apply, but if Nizer quoted the
letters primarily for commercial exploitation, fair use was inappro-
priate."3 The lower court also erred in characterizing the issue of
economic harm to the value of the copyright as merely "a factor to
be considered""' in fair use cases. The court of appeals considered
the potential damage to the copyright owner to be of "key" import-
ance.5 5 For example, Nizer's use of the Rosenberg letters might
affect the market for their republication or the sale of movie rights.
Accordingly, the Meeropol infringement case was reversed and re-
manded for further judicial inquiry."'
In the Meeropol litigation the laws of fair use and summary judg-
ment are so interwoven that it is difficult to maintain a proper
perspective of either. It is instructive to review and address sepa-
rately the principal questions involved in the case. Would distribu-
tion of The Implosion Conspiracy serve the public interest? Did
preparation of the book require some use of the Rosenberg letters?
Did Nizer's use of the letters threaten the value of the plaintiff's
copyright? Finally, did a genuine factual issue exist as to the resolu-
tion of any of these questions?
The public interest undoubtedly is served by the distribution of
The Implosion Conspiracy. Abundant evidence demonstrates the
continuing interest in the Rosenberg case."7 It has been the subject
151. Id. at 1070 (emphasis supplied).
152. See id. at 1069.
153. See id. This conclusion is precisely the sort of refined judgment that the Rosemont
court sought to avoid. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
154. 417 F. Supp. at 1210; see text accompanying note 147 supra.
155. 560 F.2d at 1070. This position has wide support in case law and commentary. See,
e.g., Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777,780 (8th Cir. 1962); Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover,
284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960), vacated for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); Marvin
Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Hill v.
Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); 3 NIMMER, supra note 17, §
.13.05[A][4]; Rosenfield, supra note 61, at 120; Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement,
56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 596 (1956).
156. 560 F.2d at 1072. On October 13, 1977, the court of appeals recalled its mandate and
stayed the reissuance pending action on a petition for certiorari filed by the defendants. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 9, 1978. 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978).
157. The Rosenberg trial has been called "the outstanding 'political' trial of this genera-
tion." Note, The Rosenberg Case: Some Reflections on Federal Criminal Law, 54 COLUM L.
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of a large number of books both in this country' 8 and throughout
the world,'59 and the trial was featured recently in two television
documentaries. 60 The National Committee to Re-Open the Rosen-
berg Case was formed in 1974, with offices in several major cities. 6
There has been an extended legal battle to secure release of the
government files on the case.16 2 Finally, the scope of interest in the
Rosenberg case is evidenced by the sale of 125,000 copies of The
Implosion Conspiracy during the first five months of its publica-
tion.6 3
Preparation of The Implosion Conspiracy, concerning as it does
the trial and post-conviction events of the Rosenberg-Sobell case,
reasonably required some use of the Rosenberg letters. Discussion
of the impact of the trial and the Rosenbergs' conviction on their
relationship is not strictly necessary to the presentation of these
events. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine how an author, desir-
ing to comment on that relationship, could do so adequately without
some use of the letters themselves. Just as the idea of the Zapruder
film could not be conveyed fully except by reproducing the film
REv. 219, 219 (1954). See also J.E. Hoover, The Crime of the Century, READERS DIGEST, May
1957, at 158.
158. E.g., J. H. FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL (1976); S. FINEBERG, THE ROSENBERG CASE: FACT AND
FICTION (1953); V. GARDNER, THE ROSENBERG STORY (1954); A. GOLDSTEIN, THE UNQUIET DEATH
OF JULIUS & ETHEL ROSENBERG (1975); R. & M. MEEROPOL, WE ARE YOUR SONS (1975); J. ROOT,
THE BETRAYERS (1963); W. & M. SCHNEIR, INvrrATION TO AN INQUEST (1965); M. P. SHARP, WAS
JUSTICE DONE? (1956); J. WEXLEY, THE JUDGMENT OF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG (1955).
159. Books on the Rosenberg trial have been published in French, German, Hebrew, Ital-
ian, Polish, and Russian.
160. The Trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was produced for ABC by Stanley Kramer
and aired on January 28, 1974. For a review of the program, see the N.Y. Times, Jan. 29,
1974, at 66, col. 4. Alvin Goldstein's award-winning documentary, The Unquiet Death of
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, was produced for a public broadcasting station. Id., Feb. 24,
1974, at 43, col. 1.
161. N.Y. Times, May 12, 1974, at 22, col. 1. The Committee was formed in New York City
and had branch offices in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Ann Arbor, Michigan. Id. The
Committee sponsored a memorial observance which sold out Carnegie Hall. Id., June 18,
1974, at 33, col. 3. The rally was held on the night of June 17, 1974. Tickets sold for three to
fifty dollars, the proceeds going to the Committee for use in the nationwide campaign to clear
the Rosenbergs' names. Id.
162. In July, 1973, Attorney General Elliot Richardson ordered the FBI to release its 25,000
page file on the Rosenberg case. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1973, at 3, col. 1. A suit seeking
compliance with that order, and the release of additional government records on the Rosen-
berg case, was filed under the Freedom of Information Act in 1975. Id., July 15, 1975, at 20,
col. 1.
163. See 361 F. Supp. at 1065.
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itself,"4 the Rosenberg letters reveal emotions and drama that nec-
essarily are lost by mere summary or description. The Rosenbergs'
words provide the only true testimony of the feelings of two public
figures who received international attention."5 Indeed, both of the
district court decisions in Meeropol recognized the importance of
quoting portions of the letters in The Implosion Conspiracy.'6
Nizer's use of the letters did not threaten the value of the Meero-
pols' copyright in their parents' correspondence. The court of ap-
peals suggested that The Implosion Conspiracy might "diminish or
prejudice the potential sale" of the Rosenberg letters;'67 the facts
suggest otherwise. Death House Letters and The Implosion
Conspiracy are dissimilar books. The former is simply a compilation
of letters written by the Rosenbergs,118 whereas The Implosion
Conspiracy is a study of the Rosenberg trial and its aftermath. The
first quoted excerpt from a Rosenberg letter appears in chapter
thirty-seven of Nizer's fifty-five chapter book, after the reader has
completed more than eighty percent of The Implosion Conspiracy. 6
"No one seriously interested in reading the published correspond-
ence of the Rosenbergs would consider purchasing The Implosion
Conspiracy." 170
Thus, the facts in the Meeropol case decisively favor the defen-
dants. The public has a demonstrated interest in the continued
distribution of The Implosion Conspiracy; preparation of the book
reasonably required use of some of the Rosenberg letters; finally, the
use of the letters posed no conceivable harm to the value of the
Meeropols' copyright. If, as suggested by Professor Nimmer, there
164. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
165. See, e.g., W. & M. SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST 175-80 (1965). See also photo-
graphs numbered 23, 24, 25, 26, 28. Id.
166. The first Meeropol opinion stated that "resort to quotations of certain of the Rosen-
bergs' letters is important to any serious book on their trial." 361 F. Supp. at 1068. The second
Meeropol opinion, in describing the letters as historical facts, implicitly reached the same
conclusion. See 417 F. Supp. at 1211.
167. 560 F.2d at 1070. No sales of Death House Letters have occurred since June 30, 1956.
Financial records establish that the total gross income from sales of the book was only $12,000.
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 127, at 4. These facts alone, however, are not persuasive.
Copyrighted material does not necessarily lose its future market because it has been out of
print for a long time. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1305[B], at 13-58 n.51.
168. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 127, at 22-23.
169. See id. at 20. "In terms of lines of type, all of the excerpts could be reproduced on
four pages of [Nizer's 495 page book]." Id. at 23.
170. Id.
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is a point at which the Constitution limits the exclusive rights of
copyright owners,' that point was reached in Meeropol v. Nize.
What has prolonged the Meeropol litigation is not the facts but
the law. The infringement claim has been before three courts. Each
court had its own understanding of fair use; each court applied
different law. Judge Tyler recognized that public interest in The
Impolosion Conspiracy was an important concern, as was the au-
thor's need to use the copyrighted letters. He resolved these ques-
tions to his satisfaction but questioned the propriety of Nizer's con-
duct, which appeared less than commendable. Judge Gagliardi ex-
tensively reviewed the fair use doctrine and then formulated an
analysis to fit the circumstances of the Meeropol case.172 His opinion
asserts that public interest is "an extremely important considera-
tion, 17 as is the potential for misuse of copyright, '7 and that dam-
age to the commercial value of Death House Letters is a factor to
be considered but is not decisive.1 75 The court of appeals concluded
that harm to the copyright owner is a key consideration and empha-
sized the importance of determining the reason for using the let-
171. See note 102 & text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
172. 417 F. Supp. at 1213; see text accompanying notes 136-49 supra.
173. 417 F. Supp. at 1207.
174. Id. at 1214 n.11. In their Brief for Certiorari, the Petitioners argued that the Meero-
pols' purpose in bringing the action was not to protect their copyright but to suppress, by
means of their copyright, Nizer's book, which concluded that the Rosenbergs received a fair
trial. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 127, at 7-8. "[O]ther authors of books on the
Rosenberg case [have] freely employed excerpts from the Death House Letters without any
objections by [the Meeropols] and without the payment of any royalties. However, unlike
Mr. Nizer, most of the authors. . . concluded that the Rosenbergs were innocent." Id. at 14
(citing V. GARDNER, THE ROSENBERG STORY (1954); W. & M. SCHNEIR, INVITArION TO AN INQUEST
(1965); J. WEXLEY, THE JUDGMENT OF JULIUS AND ETHEL ROSENBERG (1955)). The suggestion is
that if Nizer also had found that the Rosenbergs were unjustly convicted, the Meeropols
might never have brought the action. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 127, at 10. Judge
Gagliardi observed:
[Tihere is . . .an inherent danger that members of the family of a historical
figure may use a copyright on his writings as a means of suppressing unfavorable
information or comment about him by later writers rather than for the legiti-
mate protection of their proprietary interest in his intellectual product.
.. .[T]he potential for misuse of the copyright laws with respect to letters
of historical figures is an additional reason for construing the fair use doctrine
liberally in cases like this one.
417 F. Supp. at 1214 n.11. The Meeropol litigation may have been prompted more by Nizer's
opinion of the Rosenbergs' guilt than by his use of the copyrighted Rosenberg letters. For
reasons expressed in the text accompanying notes 88-89 supra, copyright largely lacks the
power of censorship.
175. 417 F. Supp. at 1210; see text accompanying note 147 supra.
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ters.17 6 This survey of the Meeropol litigation underscores Learned
Hand's observation that the line dividing copyright infringement
and fair use "will seem arbitrary."' 77
FAIR USE RECONSIDERED
The Rosemont, Bernard Geis, and Meeropol cases demonstrate
that courts remain troubled by the task of marking the boundaries
of copyright protection. The confusion evident in fair use litigation
reflects the uncertainty that exists concerning what fair use is and
how it is to be measured. Even when there is agreement as to the
factors that should control a claim of fair use, there is often disagree-
ment as to the weight to be accorded the various criteria. Most
disturbing is that the objective which fair use is designed to achieve
rarely is identified or considered thoughtfully by the courts.
The principle to be derived from Rosemont, Bernard Geis, and
Meeropol is that the scope of copyright protection is limited by the
first amendment. This limitation divides infringement and fair use.
If a use promotes progress in science and useful arts, is reasonably
necessary, and threatens no harm to the value of the allegedly in-
fringed copyright, that use is fair. Toleration of such a use is not
discretionary; it is compelled by the guarantee of free speech, which
demands an uninhibited flow of ideas and information.
What remains is to establish standards to govern the analysis of
claims of fair use. Commentators"" have wisely rejected a standard
similar to that established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 79 and
its progeny,'80 in which the Supreme Court held that, absent a show-
ing of actual malice,' 8 ' defamatory speech concerning a public figure
is protected by the first amendment. Extended to the law of copy-
right, this standard would require that, just as a public figure's
176. 560 F.2d at 1070.
177. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.).
Copyright law still benefits from the contributions of Learned Hand. See Cracas, Judge
Learned Hand and the Law of Copyright, 7 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYmp. 55 (1956).
178. 1 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.10[A]; Goldstein, supra note 19, at 987-95; Sobel, supra
note 20, at 63-79.
179. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
180. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
181. In New York Times the Court defined actual malice as knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard of the truth. 376 U.S. at 280.
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interest in his reputation or privacy occasionally must be subordi-
nated to the first amendment, a copyright proprietor must tolerate
certain uses of his property if they promote the public interest.
Several reasons militate against this analogy. First, the actual
malice requirement of New York Times "is clearly inapposite to
copyright doctrine.' ' 2 Intent to copy is not an element of copy-
right infringement."3 Although some courts consider the user's
motive relevant in fair use cases,' 4 wiser courts have been reluc-
tant to scrutinize the reason for a particular use. This reluctance
recognizes the difficulty in attempting to determine whether copy-
righted material was appropriated predominantly for commercial
or for scholarly or historical reasons. Even if it could be determined
182. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 994.
183. See, e.g., Johns & Johns Printing Co. v. Paull-Pioneer Music Corp., 102 F.2d 282, 283
(8th Cir. 1939) ("[A]n intention to infringe the copyright [is not] essential under the
Copyright Act."); Whitney v. Ross Jungnickel, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 751, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)
("If copying did in fact occur, it does not matter if it was done unconsciously and without
intent to appropriate . . ... "); Metro Associated Servs. v. Webster City Graphic, Inc., 117
F. Supp. 224, 231 (N.D. Iowa 1953) ("Intention is immaterial if infringement appears.")
(citations omitted); Malsed v. Marshall Field & Co., 96 F. Supp. 372, 375 (W.D. Wash. 1951)
("[Copyright] infringement lies in the act of infringing, and not in the intention with which
it is done.") (citations omitted). Lack of intent to infringe, however, may bear on the choice
of remedy. See 3 NImMER, supra note 17, § 13.08. See generally Latman & Tager, Liability of
Innocent Infringers of Copyrights, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 1045 (A. Fisher ed. 1963).
In an infringement action a plaintiff must prove (1) "ownership of the copyright," and (2)
"copying by the defendant." 3 NIMMER, supra note -17, § 13.01 (footnotes omitted). Ownership
is dependent upon proof of the following facts:
(1) Originality in the author; (2) copyrightability of the subject matter; (3)
citizenship status of the author such as to permit a claim of copyright; (4)
compliance with applicable statutory formalities; and (5) (if the plaintiff is not
the author) a transfer of rights or other relationship between the author and the
plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff the valid copyright claimant.
Id. § 1301[A] (footnotes omitted). Proof of most of the preceeding elements of ownership is
established by the plaintiff's copyright registration certificate, which constitutes prima facie
evidence of the plaintiff's ownership. "[T]he only evidence required of the plaintiff to estab-
lish prima facie ownership in addition to the registration certificate is evidence of plaintiff's
chain of title from the original copyright registrant." Id. (footnote omitted).
"[C]op.ing is ordinarily established indirectly by .. .proof of access and substantial
similarity." Id. § 13.01[B]. "If . . .the similarity between plaintiffs [sic] and defendant's
works is sufficiently striking and substantial the trier of fact may. . . infer copying notwith-
standing the plaintiff's failure to prove access." Id. § 13.02[B] (footnote omitted).
184. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 367 F.
Supp. 258, 362 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 802 (1977); Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion
Modelling, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); New York Tribune, Inc. v. Otis &
Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
23 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
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that copyrighted material was used predominantly for commercial
reasons, it does not follow that the use is of little or no value to the
public.1 5 If copyright law works properly, inquiry into the intent of
the user or the purpose of the plaintiff in bringing the action is un-
necessary. Such concerns tend only to obscure the fundamental
question: whether the use furthers or frustrates the purposes of co-
pyright.
Second, copyright essentially is a property interest, whereas rep-
utation and privacy have been characterized as libery interests.186
"The actual malice rule for libel and privacy [announced in New
York Times] draws a line between permissible and impermissible
injuries to another's personalty."'' 7 Copyright, by comparison, re-
quires that "a line be drawn between permitted and unpermitted
uses of another's property."'88 Rights of liberty and property are
both fundamental and demand equal and alert protection. There
are, however, significant differences between a suit for copyright
infringement and one for defamation or invasion of privacy. A pub-
lic figure who has been defamed or whose privacy has been invaded
has at least one remedy in addition to legal recourse-self-help.189
He may reply to the charges against him by exercising his own right
of free speech. This alternative, although not an adequate remedy
in all cases, is unavailable to the copyright proprietor whose work
has been appropriated. To obtain relief for injury to his property,
the copyright proprietor can resort only to available judicial reme-
dies.
Last and most importantly, a defamation suit presents a more
serious threat to first amendment freedoms than a copyright in-
fringement suit. The Alabama libel law in New York Times, like the
state privacy statute in Time, Inc. v. Hill, '9 threatened the fully
unfettered comment on matters of public interest required by the
185. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
186. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 722-23 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court
held, however, that defamation of the plaintiff by public officials did not deprive the plaintiff
of a liberty or property interest protected by due process, id. at 712, because every defamation
by a public official is not a deprivation of liberty. Id. at 702. But see Professor Van Alstyne's
opinion that it would be equally logical to classify reputation as a property interest. Van
Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 479 n.97 (1977).
187. Goldstein, supra note 19, at 995.
188. Id.
189. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
190. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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first amendment. In New York Times the Court expressed con-
cerned that "would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism" for fear of prosecution.' 9' The possibil-
ity of self-censorship'9 2 struck at the heart of the first amendment.
The Court decided, as Justice Powell later explained, that the first
amendment protects "some falsehood in order to protect speech
that matters.""' 3 Unlike the libel law challenged in New York
Times, the copyright statute largely lacks the ability to silence opin-
ion or to suppress the dissemination of facts and ideas. Copyright
protects an author's expression; his ideas are free for all to use."4
Fair Use and Infringement: A Suggested Analysis
To reform the fair use doctrine, the first step is to discard the
notion that a fair use is a privileged or fair infringement."5 The
distinction that has been drawn between a noninfringing use and an
excusable infringement has added only confusion to the law of copy-
right. This distinction suggests, erroneously, that different consider-
ations are involved in the concepts of infringement and fair use, that
a claim of infringement requires a peculiarly quantifiable analysis
while fair use involves subtle policy determinations. Infringement
and fair use are opposite ends of the spectrum of substantial similar-
ity, a spectrum permeated by policy considerations that should
govern every controversy.
The objective of copyright, to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, is attained by offering an incentive to create, that incen-
tive being protection for the creation. According to this theory, a
reduction in copyright protection results in a disincentive; the pub-
lic is then the loser. The copyright system thus equates the interests
of society with the interests of the author; assigning primacy to
either is improper."' Although the efficiency and utility of such a
copyright system have been challenged,"i' until Congress is satisfied
191. 376 U.S. at 279.
192. Self-censorship would result from "[a] rule compelling the critic of official conduct
to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions." Id.
193. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 341.
194. See cases and commentary collected in note 11 supra.
195. See note 53 supra & accompanying text.
196. See note 36 supra & accompanying text.
197. See commentary collected in note 38 supra. But see notes 40-41 supra & accompanying
text, where it is suggested that the case for copyright is far from weak.
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that copyright fails to achieve its objectives, the courts must apply
copyright law with the conviction that its premises are sound.
Three questions should be addressed squarely in each infringe-
ment action."" The threshold question is whether the allegedly in-
fringing work is entitled to the protections of the first amendment
in that its distribution would serve the public interest."' This stan-
dard is not restrictive; only those expressions that are devoid of
redeeming social value are not protected by the first amendment.
Courts must recognize that any speech safeguarded by the first
amendment also serves to advance the science and useful arts which
copyright seeks to promote. Thus the protections afforded by copy-
right and by the first amendment are complementary, not conflict-
ing. Recognizing the relationship between copyright and the first
amendment, courts should be sensitive to the proper range of reme-
dies in infringement actions: the more public interest in the alleg-
edly infringing work, the greater the impropriety of injunctive re-
lief.200
The next question is whether preparation of the allegedly infring-
ing work reasonably required some use of the copyrighted materials.
198. Under present law, fair use is an affirmative defense; the burden of proving it rests
on the defendant. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 17, § 13.05. A claim of infringement, by com-
parison, gives rise to a shifting burden of proof. See id. § 12.11ID] ("[Wihere the plaintiff
has made a strong prima facie case of copying by proving both access and a convincing
number of similarities there is a high probability that copying. . . has in fact occured so that
at that point the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the defendant who must
either negative the probability of copying by evidence of independent creation, or justify the
copying by evidence of authority from or through the plaintiff.") (footnotes omitted).
The proposed analysis calls for an allocation of burdens between the litigants. The plaintiff
must establish the likelihood of harm to his copyright; the defendant must show the public
interest in his work and that preparation of his work reasonably required some use of the
copyrighted material.
199. The degree of public interest a work commands must be determined primarily by an
examination of the work itself, considering, in particular, what the work is about. Other
indicators of public interest are the reputation of the author and sales data confirming the
work's popularity or lack thereof.
200. "[The injunction, so far as it imposes prior restraint on speech and publication
constitutes an impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights." Organization for a Better
Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 418 (1971); accord, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Any prior restraint on expression carries "a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). See
also Goldstein, supra note 18, at 1029-35. "An award of monetary damages, which permits
the infringing expression at a reasonable cost, is more tolerable from a first amendment point
of view." Id. at 1030.
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This inquiry encourages recognition that the distinction between an
idea and the expression of an idea, central to the law of copyright,
often is unclear."0 ' It also is solicitous of copyright's goal to encour-
age and reward industry and creativity. Servile imitation 2 0-
copying for the sake of copying-does not promote the progress
of science and useful arts and should be condemned. Once it is
determined that a use is not reasonably necessary, that use should
not be permitted without penalty. No social policy is advanced by
tolerating theft of an author's expression when that expression is
distinct from his ideas.
The final question is whether the allegedly infringing use endan-
gers the present or potential value of the copyrighted work. This
inquiry recognizes a third premise of copyright: economic incentive
and protection are necessary to secure the public benefits that copy-
right provides. Adherence to the copyright system requires that
harm to the value of a copyright must be compensated. To allow an
injury to the value of copyrighted material is to sanction a disincen-
tive, which eventually will discourage progress in the sciences and
useful arts. The presence of numerous competing interests and the
unusual difficulty of ascertaining injury and apportioning damages
in copyright cases203 necessitates maintenance of a flexible approach
to infringement remedies. There is a large middle ground between
the award of an injunction and the absence of liability resulting
from a finding of fair use, an area appropriate for carefully consid-
ered damage awards.
Application of this proposed infringement analysis to Rosemont,
Bernard Geis, and Meeropol would yield a different result in each
case than that reached by the court. In Rosemont the defendant's
biography of Howard Hughes was of considerable public interest,
and the use of the Look articles posed no appreciable danger to their
201. The Bernard Geis case demonstrates that the idea-expression dichotomy deserves
special attention in infringement actions involving photographic works. See 1 NIMMER, supra
note 17, § 1.10[C]. Meeropol emphasizes the need for tolerance of some reproduction of
primary source materials, works unique for their originality, research value, and authority.
202. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 139 n.(b) (K.B. 1785) (Lord Mansfield).
203. "Strictly and literally, it is true that the problem [of apportionment] is insoluble."
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1939) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd,
309 U.S. 390 (1940). See also Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1947); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
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commercial value." 4 The Random House biography, however, ap-
propriated not only the facts of Hughes' life from the Look articles
but also reproduced needlessly the expression of those facts. Be-
cause such a use was unnecessary, it should have been condemned
and damages should have been awarded." 5 In the Bernard Geis case
the defendant's book about the Kennedy assassination elicted a
great deal of public attention. Use of the Zapruder film was essen-
tial to convey the book's idea; but there was also a substantial
likelihood of harm to the plaintiff's copyright. In such circumstan-
ces the proper remedy, sensitive to both the first amendment and
to society's interest in a sound copyright system, is to award a
reasonable royalty.0 ' In Meeropol Nizer's book on the Rosenberg
trial demonstrably stirred the continuing interest in that controver-
sial case. Resort to the Rosenberg letters was reasonably neces-
sary, 27 and their use did not threaten harm to the value of the
Meeropols' copyright."' A finding of fair use was in order.29
The problem of copyright infringement cannot be reduced to pre-
cise calculation. Charged with the public interest, it requires the
most delicate sort of balancing. The proposed infringement 2'0 analy-
204. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309-11 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
205. But see note 121 supra.
206. See text accompanying note 117 supra.
207. Meeropol v. Nizer, 361 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 727 (1978).
208. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
209. The Meeropol litigation, in the courts for over five years, also illutrates the need for a
prompt award of summary judgment in certain infringement actions. Summary relief is
appropriate particularly at an early stage in libel or invasion of privacy claims against publi-
cations involving matters of public interest and concern. See generally Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 486-89 (1965); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1967). In such cases, to avoid a chilling effect on the defendant's
freedom of speech, summary judgment is granted as soon as it is evident that the plaintiff
cannot establish the actual malice required by New York Times. See Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v.
Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858, 864-65 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Rendleman, Chapters of the Civil
Jury, 65 Ky. L.J. 769, 781-87 (1977). A similar standard should be fashioned for actions of
copyright infringement. When the court is convinced that the allegedly infringing work poses
no substantial threat to the value of the plaintiff's copyright, summary judgment should be
granted.
210. Compare the proposed analysis with the test for fair use formulated by the court in
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v, Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 1009 (1967):
Whether the [fair use] privilege may justifiably be applied to particular mate-
rials turns initially on the nature of the materials, e.g., whether their distribu-
tion would serve the public interest in the free dissemination of information and
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sis would not alleviate all difficulties. Courts still would have to
make formidable judgments concerning the reasonable necessity of
a use and the degree of harm to the copyright owner. Nonetheless,
because the analysis requires consideration of the fundamental poli-
cies underlying the law of copyright, it promises decisions that bet-
ter approximate copyright's objectives. Moreover, because it is
based on policy, the analysis will be sufficiently flexible and self-
correcting to deal with the infinite variety of circumstances that
confront courts in infringement cases.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between copyright and the first amendment is more
imagined than real. Like noble adversaries at the law that "[s]trive
mightily, but eat and drink as friend," '' copyright and the first
amendment seek the same end; they differ, though, in their means
of achieving that end. Copyright yields to the first amendment by
refusing to extend its protection to an idea. On occasion, however,
the line between the expression of an idea and the idea itself is less
than distinct, and in these instances copyright of the expression
threatens to bar access to the idea as well. In such cases copyright
must yield to the command of the first amendment; some reproduc-
tion of the copyrighted materials must be permitted. The first
amendment does not dictate, however, that damage to a copyright
go fully without a remedy.
The law of copyright must reject the distinction that has been
drawn between a noninfringing use and a privileged infringement.
The distinction adds only confusion and erroneously implies that
different considerations are involved in the search for infringement
than in fair use. The question of fair use is identical to the question
of infringement. The notion that fair use claims its own niche in
copyright law and is accompanied by its own peculiar problems
must be discarded.
whether their preparation requires some use of prior materials dealing with the
same subject matter.
Id. at 307 (emphasis supplied). The chief distinction is that the Rosemont test fails to include
the question of harm to the value of the allegedly infringed copyright. Additionally, the
second element of the Rosemont analysis, that of necessity of the use, was not applied by
the court and, consequently, has been overlooked generally. Had the court considered whether
the Random House biography required use of the Look articles, it might have reached a
different conclusion. See text accompanying note 207 supra.
211. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW, Act I, sc. III.
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Although a court of equity perhaps cannot avoid being influenced
by the conduct of the parties, consideration of intent is misplaced
in the law of copyright. Inquiry into the intent of the plaintiff in
bringing an infringement action, or into the conduct and purpose of
the defendant in using the copyrighted material, tends only to ob-
scure the fundamental question: whether the use furthers or frus-
trates the ends of copyright.
Studies on whether copyright serves its objectives are needed.
Commentators today more frequently are challenging the copyright
system; despite the lack of a solid empirical foundation, the logic
of their criticisms often is convincing. Copyright is premised on the
conviction that the incentive of copyright protection is the best way
to promote progress in the sciences and useful arts. How well does
the copyright incentive work? In what areas of creative endeavor is
copyright law more influential than others? These questions may
not be readily quantifiable, but the inquiry commends itself to those
who desire to evaluate and to better understand the basis of laws.
If copyright law is to progress, its objectives and justifications
must continually be remembered. The search for substantial simi-
larity is difficult. Plagiarists do not lack cleverness; this the law has
acknowledged with its sophisticated formulas for discovering an il-
licit copy." ' Although these formulas ensure that the plagiarist will
not easily escape detection, they fail to answer the question of in-
fringement, which involves questions of policy that are not reducible
to mechanics. Justice Holmes, referring to the danger of carrying
preconceived notions into the complicated arena of constitutional
adjudication, admonished that "[t]o rest upon a formula is a slum-
ber that, prolonged, means death."2 '3
MICHAEL D. BRrrnIN
212. See note 18 supra.
213. 0. W. HoLMEs, Ideals and Doubts, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 303, 306 (1920).
1978]
